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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/799,542	03/11/2004	Carol B. Jessup	END920030113US1	7836
	7590 03/31/200 IENBERG FARLEY &	EXAMINER		
5 COLUMBIA	CIRCLE	PATS, JUSTIN		
ALBANY, NY 12203			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			3623	
			MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE
			03/31/2009	PAPER

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

## Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)	
10/799,542	JESSUP ET AL.	
Examiner	Art Unit	
JUSTIN M. PATS	3623	

		00011141111.17(10	0020
The MAI	ILING DATE of this communication appe	ears on the cover sheet with the	correspondence address
THE REPLY FILED	17 March 2009 FAILS TO PLACE THIS AP	PPLICATION IN CONDITION FOR	ALLOWANCE.
application, ap application in c	filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on oplicant must timely file one of the following condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Appe Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 C	replies: (1) an amendment, affidavi eal (with appeal fee) in compliance	it, or other evidence, which places the with 37 CFR 41.31; or (3) a Request
a) 🔲 The period	for reply expiresmonths from the mailing	g date of the final rejection.	
no event, ho Examiner N	for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this A owever, will the statutory period for reply expire la lote: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (	ater than SIX MONTHS from the mailing (b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE	g date of the final rejection.
Extensions of time may have been filed is the dunder 37 CFR 1.17(a) is set forth in (b) above, if	OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(t) be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date of date for purposes of determining the period of ext is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the standard from the following forms of the standard from	on which the petition under 37 CFR 1.1 tension and the corresponding amount shortened statutory period for reply origing than three months after the mailing data	of the fee. The appropriate extension fee inally set in the final Office action; or (2) as
	 Appeal was filed on A brief in comp	liance with 37 CFR 41.37 must be	filed within two months of the date of
filing the Notice	e of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any extereal has been filed, any reply must be filed wi	nsion thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to	avoid dismissal of the appeal. Since a
(a) They rais	d amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, to se new issues that would require further cor se the issue of new matter (see NOTE belo	nsideration and/or search (see NO	
(c) They are appeal;	e not deemed to place the application in bet and/or	ter form for appeal by materially red	
	esent additional claims without canceling a c (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).		ected ciaims.
4. 🔲 The amendme	ents are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.12	21. See attached Notice of Non-Co	mpliant Amendment (PTOL-324).
5. 🔲 Applicant's re	ply has overcome the following rejection(s):	:	
non-allowable		·	
how the new o The status of t Claim(s) allowe Claim(s) objec Claim(s) reject			il be entered and an explanation of
AFFIDAVIT OR OTH			
because applic	r other evidence filed after a final action, bu cant failed to provide a showing of good and r presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).		
entered becau	r other evidence filed after the date of filing use the affidavit or other evidence failed to o and and sufficient reasons why it is necessary	vercome <u>all</u> rejections under appea	al and/or appellant fails to provide a
	or other evidence is entered. An explanation CONSIDERATION/OTHER	n of the status of the claims after e	ntry is below or attached.
	for reconsideration has been considered but	t does NOT place the application ir	n condition for allowance because:
12. ☐ Note the attact 13. ☐ Other:	ched Information <i>Disclosure Statement</i> (s). (	(PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s)	
		/Andre Boyce/	
		Primary Examiner, Art U	Init 3623

Continuation of 11. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because: Applicant argues that Miller does not teach required fields of a question set and that therefore the rejection is improper. Applicant's Remarks, pg. 2. In response, Examiner respectfully disagrees. Each of the questions in Miller, which are for qualification purposes, are considered required fields of a question set. As such, when all the questions are automatically scored and an overall score is produced, this reflects the counting of the number of responses in required fields of a question set (how ever many the applicant responded to) and scoring the question set against a total number of required fields in the question set (seeing how completely and favorably they responded with respect to all qualifying questions and total possible score). The phrase "to product an automatic indication of strength of responses for the question set, the strength of responses indication being an automatic indication of the strength of analysis of the respective root cause of trouble", is considered intended use and is not patentably distinguishable since the prior art is readily capable of performing this function. Regarding Applicant's argument that "product development effort" is functional (Applicant's Remarks, pg. 3), there is nothing positively recited in the claim that is functionally different if applied to product development versus any other kind of employment effort. Thus, the Examiner continues to contend that this purported limitation is nonfunctional at least as currently claimed. Finally, Applicant argues that because of the differences between Whitacre and the claimed invention, there would be no need in Whitacre fore identifying specific project role(s) to provide responses to guestions of a question set for a particular root cause of trouble. Applicant's Remarks, pg. 4. In response, it is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review. In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In particular, the test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425. (CCPA 1981). Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. id. A person of ordinary skill in the art is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727, 1742 (2007). In an obviousness analysis it is not necessary to find precise teachings in the prior art directed to the specific subject matter claimed because inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ can be taken into account. Id. at 1741.